When it comes to basic disks, you have to understand what Netflix's business model is like.

According to Netflix’s recent quarterly revenue, the bulk of their revenue is still mainly from video rentals, which means that Netflix’s main revenue source: the monthly payment of users has not yet developed.

However, according to the trends that have emerged at this time, Netflix’s business model for users, that is, the proportion of users who pay a fixed monthly membership fee in exchange for unlimited video content on the Netflix website is increasing year by year.

However, this model has always had a shortcoming: when the existing content of streaming media sites cannot attract users, the number of users' monthly payments will drop rapidly. For example, Tudou and Youku in the Mainland have made good explanations, namely, streaming media Market share is not static and deep-rooted.

Of course, Netflix is ​​still cultivating paying users, which means that the video content of Netflix’s website is very attractive relative to its cost of payment. The audience is willing to spend this money to enjoy it, otherwise the proportion will not increase year by year.

A little more careful, it means that Netflix's increased users are robbed from other entertainment markets, and the core competitiveness they rob is copyright.

In the past, movies were drawn offline from theaters to enter the DVD market or TV stations. However, the emergence of Netflix has given more options for watching movies, video websites, and more convenient mobile phone playback in the future.

From the analysis of users' consumption behavior, the user portraits Netflix faces should be users who like to watch video images in exchange for spiritual joy.

From this perspective, Netflix’s potential user groups should include: DVD favorite users (the original market segment users of Netflix), TV drama favorite users (TV users), and online video favorite users (competitors in the same field like YouTube) , Movie favorite users and so on.

In other words, the media giants at this moment are not clearly aware of Netflix’s plundering of users in other image consumer markets, because Netflix’s development is based on the premise that TV users shift their viewing channels-the choice of content to be played. Whether it can form a competitive advantage over competitors is the foundation of Netflix.

Because watching a movie from the theater or TV is somewhat random and cannot cater for all the audiences, Netflix is ​​different, where you can search for the type you like, which can be described as tailor-made.

That is to say, the core of Netflix’s future competition lies in whether it can provide users with a higher price-performance ratio for image consumption (that is, the same mental pleasure, Netflix's cost is lower. Or the same consumption cost, Netflix's products are more spiritually pleasant. high).

Looking at the future, Netflix has succeeded, and they have become the kings of the global streaming media field. The slogan "Netflix produced, it must be a boutique" has been a topic that fans talked about. This was the signature of HBO before.

And here, Netflix achieves corner overtaking and the means to break the existing pattern is called "disruptive innovation."

Putting the word destruction in this context is definitely not a derogatory meaning. What was the film industry like in the past?The model has long been set, and the development of numerous projects is very complete and industrial. Even in the process of perfection, offline giants such as Blockbuster have been spawned, so that the store bullied its customers and in turn squeezed the interests of the studio. Exclusive authorization and increase channel service fees.

In the 1990s, many small studios hated Blockbuster, and under such demand, Netflix came into being.

However, it is naturally very difficult for a new industry to challenge itself head-on. No matter whether it is competing financial, material resources or investing resources, what does Netflix compare to Blockbuster?

Ever since, Netflix has bypassed the difficulty of insufficient offline stores through an innovative online ordering and DVD distribution model, and has begun to develop from an unexpected perspective.

In layman's terms, Netflix is ​​the Apple of the mobile phone market, and Blockbuster is the Nokia of the day.

The status quo of the two actually corresponds to the future market. After all, Blockbuster is only a leasing broker, and Netflix is ​​not only seizing the leasing market, but the trend of world development.

In the beginning, did Blockbuster take Netflix to heart?Not at all. It naively thinks that its opponents are only those difficult content providers or foreign careerists like Sony.

But I didn't expect it to fall first. At the beginning of 2010, Blockbuster once again announced the closure of 90 stores in overseas regions, reducing operating costs but still revenue difficulties, it may not last this year.

Did the boss of Blockbuster do something wrong?No, although everyone complains about its poor service, the problem is that it controls enough resources, but they just lost, lost to rookies in the industry.

The so-called "destructive innovation" is precisely because the original grid force does not need to do wrong, but if it fails to keep up with the rhythm, it will be eliminated.

This is the case with Nokia and the same with Blockbuster. They are all playing well in their fields, and they are suddenly hit by dimensionality reduction.

"As long as the target audience is large enough, those non-mainstream, low-demand film copyrights can also create revenues similar to those of popular blockbusters."

On the phone, Lyman, who returned to the crew to continue filming, took time to answer Joseph's doubts.

"For example, "Twilight" sells very well. Even if it is licensed to Netflix on-demand, it can generate hundreds of thousands of profits in a month, but the on-demand profits of more than 100 popular and bad movies are hundreds of thousands a month. Netflix The power of this kind of streaming media is that it can sell products that do not have offline distribution at better prices, or that they are more accurate than the existing model and can improve the turnover rate of resources."

"Of course, from the financial report, the money they make from paying users is not enough to pay for the authorized movie fees, but after all, their fee group is less than 2 million. What if it is 20 million, 40 million, 100 million? They will definitely make money."

In 2010, Netflix’s copyright library had a total of more than 3,200 movies. Every year, for these, they have to give content providers such as Firefly, Fox and other studios tens of millions of license fees, not including the profit sharing after the on-demand. And their number of users obviously can't meet the cost of the film library, but this is just a necessary period of pain.

Netflix’s delivery model has always been able to accumulate little. If it’s a Blockbuster store, there can only be more than 1,000 movies on the shelves, and the cost is high, and it needs to be disguised to oppress the studio to expand its revenue. And Netflix, Just like Meituan’s takeaway business, the early stage burns money to occupy the market. When the base is sufficient to meet the demand, the speed of rolling the snowball will only get faster and faster, and the proportion of pure content costs will continue to decrease until the entire video is completed. Absolute hegemony of the market-of course, the latter is still difficult, and it is not easy to monopolize the streaming media market.

No, Lehman also wants to learn from Disney, to be independent, don’t forget, he has Marvel in his hands, Disney is gone...